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CASE NOTES
SALES-UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR CLAUSE-
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Defendant, in 1962, purchased certain household items from the plain-
tiff pursuant to a standardized form contract. Included in this contract
was the provision that as long as any unpaid balance remained on this
merchandise, plaintiff retained the right to repossess items previously pur-
chased, even though they had been paid for in full. Upon default, plain-
tiff brought proceedings against defendant-vendee, relying upon this con-
tractual device to repossess merchandise purchased as early as 1957. Judg-
ment was entered for plaintiff in the trial court, and this holding was
affirmed in the intermediate court of review. On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the case was re-
manded for consideration of whether the contract was unenforceable by
virtue of its alleged unconscionable character. Williams v. Walter-Thomas
Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.Cir. 1965).
In basing its decision upon the doctrine of unconscionability, the
Court of Appeals cited as authority section 2-3021 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, even though the Code had not been adopted in the Dis-
trict of Columbia at the time the contract was made. The purpose of
this case note is to examine the doctrine of unconscionability in terms of
both theory and application. In the scope of this analysis, it will become
evident to the reader that section 2-302 merely codifies a legal and equi-
table defense which has evolved from the common law.
Though the right to contract freely has been referred to as the in-
evitable counterpart of a free enterprise system,"'2 its exercise has not
always led to just and equitable results, in spite of the assumption that
each party is best able to provide for his own interest. At an earlier date
in England, the law courts, when dealing with unfair sales contracts, ar-
rived at an equitable result by refusing to enforce the unjust contractual
provision freely "bargained for.' 3 A similar result was reached on this
I UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-302 (1962). "(1) If the court as a matter of law
finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remain-
der of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. (2) When it
is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination."
2 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943). See also, Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL
L.Q. 365 (1921).
3 In James v. Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (1664), the action was in assumpsit to pay
for a horse at the rate of a barley corn per nail, doubling it every nail. There were
32 nails in the shoes of the horse, bringing the price of the horse to 500 quarters of
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side of the Atlantic, where it has been held that if an agreement is un-
reasonable and unconscionable, although not void for fraud, a court of
law will give the party who sues for its breach damages, not according
to its letter, but only that to which he is equitably entitled.4 Conversely,
other cases have held that in the absence of fraud or oppression the
courts are not interested in the unreasonableness of contracts voluntarily
entered into between parties compos mentis and sui juris.5
In contrast to the dichotomy of opinion in law courts, Equity courts
will refuse to specifically enforce a contract if there will be an uncon-
scionable result." The bases upon which Equity courts have refused to
enforce a contract for unconscionability have been diverse.7 This can be
explained by the fact that no practical definition of unconscionability
has been forthcoming, although it has been attempted.8
barley. The court directed the jury to discard the terms agreed upon and give the
plaintiff the value of the horse which was 8 pounds in damages. In Thornborough v.
Whiteacre, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164, 92 Eng. Rep. 270 (1706), plaintiff declared that the de-
fendant in consideration of 2s. 6d. paid down and 4 pounds, 17 s. 6 d. to be paid on
performance of the agreement promised to give plaintiff 2 grains of rye on a certain
Monday and doubling it successfully on every Monday for a year. The total amount of
rye would have amounted to 524,288,000 quarters. The court held that if a man under-
take for valuable consideration to do what is impossible, an action will lie against him
for non-performance. However, the court recognized the case of James v. Morgan as
good law and said though the contract was a foolish one, the defendant ought to pay
something for his "folly." The parties settled for a half-crown and costs and no
judgment was given. See generally the discussion of English authorities in Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889).
4 Hume v. United States, supra note 3; Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. 443 (1870);
Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (1861); Baxter v. Wales, 12 Mass. 365 (1815); Leland v. Stone,
10 Mass. 459 (1813); Luing v. Petersen, 143 Minn. 6, 172 N.W. 692 (1919); Greer v.
Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427 (N.Y. 1872).'
5 See Florida Sportservice Inc. v. Miami, 121 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1960); Brewington v.
Loughran, 183 N.C. 558, 112 S.E. 257 (1923); Findlayson v. Findlayson, 17 Or. 347, 21
Pac. 57 (1889).
6 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d. 80 (3rd. Cir. 1948); Indianapolis Morris Plan
Corp. v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E.2d 899 (1961); Heningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 352, 161 A.2d. 69 (1960). See generally, 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCES 1405(a) (Sth ed. 1941).
7 4 POMEROY, supra note 6 at 1043, wherein it is said, "[t]he contract must be perfectly
fair, equal, and just in its terms and in its circumstances: If then, the contract itself is
unfair, one sided, unjust, unconscionable, or affected by any other inequitable feature;
or if its enforcement would be oppressive or hard on the defendant, or would prevent
his enjoyment of his own rights, or would work injustice; or if the plaintiff has obtained
it by sharp and unscrupulous practices, by over-reading, by trickery, by taking undue
advantage of his position, bv non-disclosure of material facts, or by any other uncon-
scientious means, then specific performance will be refused."
8 The most common definition of an unconscionable contract or agreement is "one
which no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make on the one hand, and
which no fair and honest man would make on the other." BLAcK, LAw DIcTIONARY
(4th ed. 1951).
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Notwithstanding the lack of any well formulated common-law rule
denying remedies which impose undue hardships, the fluidity of the
concepts of offer, acceptance, consideration, fraud, duress, misrepre-
sentation, and so forth, has enabled courts to avoid the enforcement of
unconscionable contracts. The manipulation of these concepts has led
to justifiable criticism, in that it has resulted in leaving "twisted law on
the books to perplex and mislead lawyers and judges considering cases
in which the concept of unconscionability is not present". 9 According
to Professor Hawkland, section 2-302 was included in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to enable courts of law to pass directly upon the question
of unconscionability instead of "bastardizing" legal concepts or adversely
construing the language in the contract.10
Although the Uniform Commercial Code does not contain a definition
of unconscionability, the official comments of the commissioners are
helpful in this regard. In the 1949 draft, the comments indicate that the
"section is intended to apply to the field of sales the Equity court's an-
cient policy of policing contracts for unconscionability and unreason-
ableness"." The present comments are similar in that they state the
section
is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the
contracts . . . they find to be unconscionable . . .. the principle is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not disturbance of allo-
cations of risks based on superior bargaining power.12
The problem of unfair surprise has arisen most often in the application
of rules of assent to form contracts, whereas, examples of oppression have
arisen in cases of unequal bargaining power in diverse fact situations.'3
The standard of oppression and unfair surprise is the basis of what is to
be considered unconscionable. However, the commercial setting and
surrounding circumstances are additional factors which the court should
take into consideration. This freedom of interpretation has been criti-
cized by those who allege that it would "stir up" litigation and increase
uncertainty in court decisions, 14 in addition to breaching the maxim that
9 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 27 (4th ed. 1958).
'
0 HAWKLAND, Major Changes Under the Uniform Commercial Code In Sales Con-
tracts, 10 PRAcT. LAW. 73, 90 (1964); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-302, comments
(1962).
11 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODES 2-302, comments (1949).
12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODES 2-302, comments (1962).
i1 For a more complete discussion of the implication of oppression and unfair sur-
prise, see 45 VA. L. REV. 583 (1959).
14 Note, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 146, 152 (1950).
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courts should not endeavor to make contracts for the parties.15 As a re-
sult of such criticism, it has been suggested that the section on uncon-
scionability be omitted altogether from the Code.'8 Though the Uniform
Commercial Code has been adopted in forty-four jurisdictions,' 7 both
California and North Carolina have omitted section 2-302 entirely.18
Despite this criticism, the court's freedom of discretion on the question
of unconscionability would seem to be its prime asset, since the factual
situations surrounding different contracts are considerably diverse, and
a strict definition would hinder rather than assist reaching an equitable and
just result.
Where a contract or clause is declared unconscionable, section 2-302
further provides that the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or limit application of any unconscionable clause so as to avoid any un-
conscionable result.19 Since the court can eliminate certain clauses from
the contract on the basis of unconscionability and enforce the remainder,
the question arises as to what happens to the party who at the time of
the contract intended the unconscionable clause or clauses to be an in-
tegral part of the contract. Is he to be bound to the remainder of the
contract to his manifest intention? The Code appears to answer this ques-
tion in the affirmative. As a safeguard against such a result, it has been
suggested that the parties include a provision in the contract stating
whether or not the entire contract should stand if any particular clause
or clauses are later held to be unconscionable.20 Even though such a
clause would not be binding on the court, it would, no doubt, influence
the court's decision by manifesting the intent of the parties as to the
matter of unconscionability.21
Where it is likely that the contract or clause will be held unconscion-
able, section 2-302 (2) provides that "the parties shall be afforded a reason-
15 Note, 33 ORE. L. REV. 113, 115 (1954). 161d. at 116.
17 In the following jurisdictions, the Code has been adopted and is presently in
effect: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virgin Is-
lands, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. In the remainder of the juris-
dictions, the Code has been adopted but will not become effective until the indicated
dates: Alabama (Jan. 1, 1967), Colorado (Sept. 1, 1966), Florida (Jan. 1, 1967), Hawaii
(Jan. 1, 1967), Iowa (Sept. 4, 1966), Minnesota (Sept. 1, 1966), Nevada (March 1,
1967), North Carolina (Sept. 1, 1967), North Dakota (Sept. 1, 1966), Texas (Sept. 1,
1966), Washington (Sept. 1, 1967). UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 2-302 (1965 supp.).
18 Ibid. 1o UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-302(1) (1962).
201 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-302:2 (1961).
21 Ibid.
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able opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose
and effect to aid the court in making the determination." 22 This feature
of the Code is new, and its importance lies in the fact that it provides an
opportunity for the adverse party to present evidence of the surround-
ing circumstances and commercial setting. This is a matter of right, and
not subject to limitation by the court.21 It would seem that this provi-
sion, which is partly procedural and partly substantive, protects the ad-
verse party from being surprised by the issue of unconscionability where
his opponent did not allege it in his pleadings, but rather the court first
raised the issue of its own discretion. It should be recognized, however,
that once the evidence is introduced, the court, and not the jury, is the
ultimate arbiter of this issue.24
Turning now to the matter of form contracts, it was noted earlier that
contracts of this type are more susceptible of being held unconscionable,
since they are more likely to be oppressive. This is understandable, since
the party printing such a contract would be more likely to include terms
favorable to himself rather than the other contracting party. Despite
this obvious advantage, standardized form contracts were created as a
matter of practical necessity:
the development of large scale enterprise with its mass production and distri-
bution made a new type of contract inevitable-the Standardized Mass Con-
tract. A standardized contract, once its contents have been formulated by a
business firm, is used in every bargain dealing with the same product or service.
The individuality of the parties which so frequently gave color to the old type
of contract has disappeared. 25
Consequently, the average individual who becomes a party to a form
contract usually agrees to a type of transaction in which only such mat-
ters as price, quantity and quality are of interest. The remaining set of
collateral form provisions used to limit risk and promote certainty are
seldom given attention and it is through these terms that unfair advantage
is derived. 26 Professor Llewellyn contended that where form contracts
are printed by one side, the courts should recognize that what is in print
does not necessarily represent the true bargain. In his opinion, judges
should be able
to see that a free contract presupposes a free bargain, and that a free bargain
presupposes free bargaining, and that where bargaining is absent in fact, the
conditions and clauses to be read into the bargain are not those which happen
22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-302 (2) (1962).
23 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 20 at S 2-302:5.
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-302 (2), comments (1962).
25 Kessler, supra note 2 at 631.
26 18 U. CHI. L. REv., supra note 14. See generally, Note, 63 HAzv. L. REv. 494 (1950),
for a more thorough discussion of printed form contracts.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
to be printed on the unread paper, but are those which a sane man might reason-
ably expect to. find on that paper. The background of trade practices give a
first indication; the line of authority rejecting unreasonable practice offers the
needed corrective. The distinction involved, even when applied to the testing
of a standardized printing, is a simple one, and one which responds rather
readily to the trained intuition of a case law judge for what is too unfair.2 7
At a later date, Llewellyn felt that in the area of sales law, the Uniform
Commercial Code would assist judges considerably in avoiding enforce-
ment of those
. 
not-bargained-for provisions through the "good faith" pro-
visions contained therein.2 8 It was his belief that:
these provisions may lead appellate courts into a machinery for striking down
where striking down is needed, without getting in the way of reasonable con-
struction of the reasonable, and without need for wholly upsetting the deal in
order to escape a particular obnoxious result.29
Even though this effective tool has been put into the hands of the law
courts, there has not: been any great occasion to use it, as evidenced by
the sparseness of cases decided under this section or referring to it as "good
law."
Considering now the matter of judicial interpretation of section 2-302,
at this, date only six decisions may be found which provide persuasive
authority in the avoidance of unconscionable contracts. In three of these
cases, however, the Code had not been adopted at the time the contracts
were made, but this did not deter the courts from relying thereon.
In those cases where the Uniform Commercial Code had been adopted
prior to the contracting date, the courts did not rely solely upon section
2-302 as the basis for their decision. In American Home Improvement
Inc. v. Maclver,ao the defendant contracted with a home improvement
company and signed a financing agreement which, in violation of a New
Hampshire statute, did not disclose the interest rate or other fees. De-
fendant breached the contract upon realizing that he would be forced
to pay $2,568.00 for material and labor which originally was estimated
at $1,759.00. In denying recovery to the plaintiff, the court held that the
purpose of the disclosure statute would be implemented, and, in addition,
offered section 2-302 as an alternative argument. The court was influenced
by the fact that plaintiff's performance had been negligible, and noted
27 Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 704 (1939).
2 8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 1-203, 2-301(1)(b) and 2-302 (1962). Section
1-203 provides that "every contract of duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." Section 2-103 (1) (b) states that "good
faith in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
29 LLEWELLYN, TnE COMMON LAW TRADITION, 362, 369 (1960).
ao 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d. 886 (1964).
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that if enforcement was granted, defendant would be-: required to pay
$1,609.00 over and above the fair cost.
The case of In Re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co. Inc.31 involved the matter of
secured transactions, covered by article 9 of the Code. The creditor had
advanced 75% of the accounts receivable in return for a security interest
therein, in addition to other assets being pledged by the debtor. Among
other provisions, the contract stated that the debtor was prohibited from
selling or assigning accounts to anyone other than the creditor, but the
creditor was not obligated to buy any accounts. The debtor was pro-
hibited from borrowing from anyone other than the creditor without
the creditor's permission, and the creditor had the unilateral right to
change terms of the contract upon certified mail notice to the debtor.
In refusing to enforce the contract, the court held that the doctrine of
unconscionability was applicable to article 9 as well as to article 2. Since
section 1-102(3) imposes a general obligation of good faith upon the
parties, it was reasoned that the "unconscionabilityl features of section
2-302 should be incorporated by reference into the basic underlying
philosophy expressed in section 1-102."
The same rationale was applied in the case of In Re Dorset Steel Equip-
ment Co., Inc.32 wherein a security agreement was entered into whereby'
the creditor advanced certain sums to a partnership. Although the trans-
action was secured by the assignment of accounts receivable, the obligor
was required to incorporate in order that the creditor might exact in-
terest of approximately 18% per annum. Other unconscionable features
were contained in the agreement as well. The court held that a contract
of this nature would not be recognized as a valid claim against the bank-
rupt and referred to section 2-302.
As noted earlier, even where the Code was not yet in force at the time
of contracting, the courts have turned to section 2-302. In Quality Fi-
nance Co. v. Hurley,;8 the court used this section in determining the
validity of a waiver of defenses by a vendee as against the vendor's as-
signee. In Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors InC.,3 4 the court held that a
disclaimer of all other express or implied warranties, except replacement
of defective parts in a contract for the -sale of a new automobile, was
"violative of public policy and void."' 35
31 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE 1021 (U.S. Dist. Ct., ED. Pa.,
Bankruptcy no. 26109, 1965).
82 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE 1016 (U.S. Dist. Ct., ED. Pa.,
Bankruptcy no. 26532, 1965).
83 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958).
84 32 N.J. 358, 161A.2d 69 (1960).
35 Id. at 408, 161 A.2d at 97.
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The case at bar likewise falls into this category. Here, the court took
cognizance of the fact that
Congress has recently enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, which specifi-
cally provides that the court may refuse to enforce a contract which it finds
to be unconscionable at the time it was made .... The enactment of this sec-
tion, which occurred subsequent to the contracts here in suit, does not mean
that the common law of the District of Columbia was otherwise at the time
of enactment, nor does it preclude the court from adopting a similar rule in
the exercise of its powers to develop the common law for the District of
Columbia."6
Thus, the true import of the instant case is readily ascertained by the
language of the court. From this decision, it is evident that, even in the
absence of section 2-302, the common law of the District of Columbia
had the inherent means effectively to cope with the problem of uncon-
scionable contracts.
In conclusion, although it is difficult to predict any specific trend from
either Walker or those cases which have considered section 2-302, it ap-
pears that its application will not be limited merely to standardized form
contracts or to contracts for the sale of goods. In the past, both judges
and chancellors have granted relief from the oppressive features of gross-
ly unfair contracts, and there is no logical reason why they should not
continue to do so. The presence of section 2-302 will serve to provide
additional impetus in this regard, and thus aid the courts in dealing with
this problem. It is submitted, however, that though an effective tool has
been placed at the court's disposal, caution should be exercised in its use.
Contracts should be held intact where the intent of the parties clearly
manifests a desire to enter into such an agreement. To declare an entire
contract unenforceable due to one insignificant unconscionable clause
is certainly as unjust and inequitable as permitting enforceability of that
single clause. Peter A postal
36 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
TORTS-CHARITABLE HOSPITAL IMMUNITY-
A MODIFIED DOCTRINE ABROGATED
The plaintiff, Clarence Lee Adkins, brought action against the defend-
ant hospital to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted upon him
while he was a paying patient' in the hospital. The injuries sustained
consisted of severe burns resulting from plaintiff's fall against a hot,
1 Affidavits were presented to the court stating that the defendant hospital refused
to admit the plaintiff until assurance was given that the bill for his care would be paid.
